Macroeconomic Effects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Survey by Chu, Angus C.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Macroeconomic Effects of Intellectual
Property Rights: A Survey
Angus C. Chu
Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica
September 2009
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17342/
MPRA Paper No. 17342, posted 22. September 2009 11:18 UTC
Macroeconomic E¤ects of
Intellectual Property Rights: A Survey
Angus C. Chu
Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica
September 2009
Abstract
This paper provides a survey on studies that analyze the macro-
economic e¤ects of intellectual property rights (IPR). The rst part of
this paper introduces di¤erent patent-policy instruments and reviews
their e¤ects on R&D and economic growth. This part also discusses the
distortionary e¤ects and distributional consequences of IPR protection
as well as empirical evidence on the e¤ects of patent rights. Then, the
second part considers the international aspects of IPR protection. In
summary, this survey draws the following conclusions from the litera-
ture. Firstly, di¤erent patent-policy instruments have di¤erent e¤ects
on R&D and growth. Secondly, there is empirical evidence supporting
a positive relationship between IPR protection and innovation, but the
evidence is stronger for developed countries than for developing coun-
tries. Thirdly, the optimal level of IPR protection should tradeo¤ the
social benets of enhanced innovation against the social costs of mul-
tiple distortions and income inequality. Finally, in an open economy,
achieving the globally optimal level of protection requires an interna-
tional coordination (rather than the harmonization) of IPR protection.
Keywords: economic growth, innovation, intellectual property rights
JEL classication: O31, O34, O40, F13
Address: Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan
Email: angusccc@econ.sinica.edu.tw
This article provides a partial survey of the macroeconomic literature on
intellectual property rights. The author would like to thank two anonymous
referees for their insightful comments and helpful suggestions. The usual
disclaimer applies.
1
1 Introduction
In the rst year of graduate coursework in economics, students are often en-
countered with the following important and perhaps surprising theoretical
result. The rst fundamental theorem of welfare economics states that any
competitive or Walrasian equilibrium leads to a Pareto e¢ cient allocation
of resources. In other words, competitive markets are e¢ cient. Therefore,
governments should simply let the market do its work and the market out-
come will be Pareto e¢ cient. However, in reality, the ideal conditions of
perfect competition are not necessarily satised. In this situation, we may
have market failures in over-providing or under-providing certain resources.
An important example is investment in research and development (R&D).
There is an established empirical nding that the social return to R&D is
much higher than the private return.1 Jones and Williams (1998, 2000)
develop an R&D-based growth model and use these empirical estimates to
show that the socially optimal level of R&D is at least two to four times
higher than the market level. Therefore, overcoming this market failure
would increase R&D towards the socially optimal level as well as increasing
innovation, economic growth and social welfare. The purpose of this paper
is to provide a selective survey on studies that analyze the macroeconomic
e¤ects of intellectual property rights.
The seminal study of the patent-design literature is Nordhaus (1969),
who concludes that the optimal patent length should balance between the
static distortionary e¤ect of patent protection and the dynamic gain from en-
hanced innovation. While Nordhaus (1969) considers only the patent length,
Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) analyze the optimal combination of patent length
and breadth and argue that the socially optimal policy combination is an
innite patent length and a minimum degree of patent breadth. Although
this result does not necessarily hold in a more general model,2 Gilbert and
Shapiro (1990) provide one of the rst studies on the optimal combina-
tion of patent-policy instruments. A comprehensive review of the subse-
quent developments in this literature can be found in Scotchmer (2004).
While most studies in the patent-design literature are based on a qualita-
tive partial-equilibrium setting, a quantitative dynamic general-equilibrium
(DGE) analysis becomes important when one wants to consider the macro-
economic implications of raising IPR protection. The following quote reects
the importance of such an analysis.
1See, for example, Griliches (1992) for a review on this literature.
2See, for example, Klemperer (1990).
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[T]here is much to be done to understand the pace of techno-
logical progress in frontier economies. Our models of endogenous
technological change give us the basic framework for thinking
about how prot incentives shape investments in new technolo-
gies. [. . . ] But most of our understanding of these issues is qual-
itative. For example, in the context of the economics of innova-
tion, we lack a framework similar to that used for the analysis
of the e¤ects of capital and labor income taxes and indirect taxes
in public nance which could be used to analyze the e¤ects of
[. . . ] IPR policies [. . . ] on innovation and economic growth.
Daron Acemoglu (2009, p. 873)
This survey article is structured as follows. The rst part (Sections 2-
4) introduces the di¤erent patent-policy instruments, such as patentability
requirement, patent length and patent breadth, and reviews their e¤ects on
R&D and innovation using the celebrated R&D-based endogenous-growth
model of Romer (1990) and its subsequent developments as the conceptual
framework. In this part of the paper, I also discuss various distortionary
e¤ects and the distributional consequences of raising IPR protection as well
as empirical evidence on the e¤ects of patent rights. Then, the second part
(Sections 5-6) considers the international aspects of IPR protection.3 In
summary, this survey draws the following conclusions from the literature.
Firstly, di¤erent patent-policy instruments can have positive, insignicant
or even negative e¤ects on R&D and growth. Secondly, there is empirical
evidence for a positive relationship between IPR protection and innovation,
but the evidence seems to be stronger for developed countries than for de-
veloping countries. Thirdly, the optimal level of patent protection should
tradeo¤ the social benets of enhanced innovation against the social costs
of multiple distortions and income inequality. Finally, in an open economy,
achieving the globally optimal level of protection requires an international
coordination (rather than the harmonization) of IPR protection.
3This survey proceeds in two steps by rstly discussing the closed-economy studies and
then the open-economy studies for the following reason. The closed-economy IPR litera-
ture analyzes the domestic e¤ects of IPR protection, which have received much empirical
attention. Although the empirical studies to be discussed are based on cross-country re-
gressions, they are mostly examining the e¤ects of domestic patent protection on domestic
innovation. However, the focus of the open-economy IPR literature is on the cross-country
e¤ects of patent protection, which have received far less empirical attention. Therefore,
this survey rstly reviews the closed-economy literature followed by the related empirical
evidence and then the open-economy literature.
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2 Patent policy instruments
Patent policy has multiple instruments that can be used to a¤ect the in-
centives for R&D and innovation. One instrument is the patent length that
determines the statutory term of patent. In most countries, a patent has a
statutory length of 20 years as a result of the TRIPS agreement.4 Although
this instrument can be easily measured by the number of years for which
an invention is protected, extending the patent length is unlikely to be an
e¤ective way to increase R&D in most industries.5 In some countries, to
maintain the legal status of a patent requires a patent maintenance fee. For
example, in the US, patent maintenance fees were initiated in 1982. Cur-
rently, the fees are due 3.5 years ($980), 7.5 years ($2480) and 11.5 years
($4110) after a (utility) patent is granted. In some European countries, this
fee is due annually. Therefore, if most patents are not renewed until the end
of the statutory term, then we may conclude that increasing the statutory
patent length would not be an e¤ective way to increase R&D because an av-
erage patent after being granted for a certain period of time is not worth as
much as the patent maintenance fee. Schankerman and Pakes (1986) indeed
nd that about half of all patents are not renewed within 10 years and only
10% of them are renewed until the end of the statutory term in their sample
of European countries. Similarly, a recent study by Bessen (2008) estimates
a ow-prot depreciation rate of 14% for US patents. In other words, the
amount of prots earned by an average patent decreases at an annual rate of
14%. Suppose a patent generates $X per year today. Using a 14% ow-prot
depreciation rate, this patent will generate only 6% of $X per year after 20
years. Given the estimated ow-prot depreciation rate and the average
historical interest rate, one can do a simple partial-equilibrium calculation
(i.e. holding the depreciation rate and the interest rate constant) to show
that extending the patent length beyond 20 years would lead to a very small
percent increase in the market value of patents.
A number of studies analyze the optimal patent length in DGE mod-
els. For example, Judd (1985) nds that the optimal patent length is in-
nite while Futagami and Iwaisako (2003, 2007) nd that the optimal patent
4The World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of In-
tellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), initiated in the 1986-94 Uruguay Round, establishes
a minimum level of IPR protection to be provided by all member countries by 2006.
5An important exception would be the pharmaceutical industry. The e¤ectiveness of
patent protection varies across industries, and it is well known that patent protection is
especially e¤ective in the pharmaceutical industry. See, for example, Chu (2008) for an
analysis on the implications of pharmaceutical companies lobbying the US government for
extending the patent length on drugs.
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length can be nite in a version of the Romer model.6 While it is an inter-
esting and important theoretical question to explore the optimal duration
of patent, a more relevant question in terms of policy implications is per-
haps the magnitude of welfare gains from changing the patent length to its
socially optimal level. An important rst study that analyzes the quanti-
tative implications of patent extension in a DGE model is Kwan and Lai
(2003), who nd that extending the e¤ective lifetime of patent would lead
to a substantial increase in R&D and welfare. Kwan and Lai (2003) use
the same nal-goods production function as in the original Romer model
that imposes a restriction on the markup and capital share. This usually
innocuous setup restricts the ow-prot growth rate of each patent to equal
the labor-force growth rate that is nonnegative,7 and this counterfactual
implication leads to an upward bias on the e¤ects of extending the patent
length on R&D. Using an extended version of the Romer model to match
the empirical ow-prot depreciation rate of patent, Chu (2009a) nds that
extending the patent length beyond 20 years leads to a negligible increase
in R&D and consumption while shortening the patent length leads to their
signicant reduction. In other words, patent length on average loses its
e¤ectiveness on R&D at roughly 20 years.
Given that patent length is not an e¤ective instrument in increasing R&D
in most industries, it is perhaps not surprising that the patent reform in the
US initiated in the 80s was related to other aspects of patent rights, such as
lowering the patentability requirement and broadening the patent breadth.8
We discuss each of these instruments in turn. To obtain a patent for an
invention in the US, the invention has to be novel and non-obvious. The
non-obviousness requirement states that a patentable invention must not be
obvious to a person skilled in the art. These novelty and non-obviousness
requirements are often referred to as the patentability requirement. Using
6These di¤erent results arise for the following reason. In Judd (1985), the relative-
price distortion disappears at an innite patent length for which all goods are subject to
equal monopolistic pricing. In Futagami and Iwaisako (2003, 2007), there is an additional
distortion on the allocation of intermediate goods, and this distortionary e¤ect can be
reduced by shortening the patent length.
7This setup is innocuous for an endogenous-growth model that does not deal with
IPR-related issues. However, when it comes to analyzing the e¤ects of patent length,
restricting the ow-prot growth rate g of patent to be nonnegative is problematic and
counterfactual. In brief, the restriction arises from g = gY  gA, where gY denotes output
growth and gA denotes the growth rate of varieties that is equal to the growth rate of total
factor productivity in the Romer model. Therefore, the Romer model implies that g  0
while empirical studies, such as Bessen (2008), nd that g < 0.
8See Ja¤e (2000), Gallini (2002) and Ja¤e and Lerner (2004) for a discussion.
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the Grossman-Helpman (1991a) R&D-based growth model in which innova-
tion takes the form of higher-quality products,9 ODonoghue and Zweimuller
(2004) show that lowering the patentability requirement (i.e. the required
inventive step size modeled as a policy-imposed lower bound on the size of
each quality improvement) has opposing e¤ects on R&D and innovation.10
On one hand, it increases the incentives for R&D by making it easier for
an inventor to obtain a patent. On the other hand, it decreases the incen-
tives for R&D by reducing the amount of prots generated by an invention
due to its smaller quality improvement and by raising the chance that the
next invention is patentable and takes away market share from the current
invention. It can be shown that the prot-maximizing inventive step size
is below the growth-maximizing step size due to the positive externality of
product quality on economic growth. Therefore, the policy implication is
that lowering the patentability requirement has a theoretically ambiguous
e¤ect on R&D and growth.
Patent breadth refers to the broadness or the scope of a patent. When an
inventor applies for a patent to protect her invention, she makes a number
of claims about this invention to be reviewed by a patent examiner. Patent
breadth determines how specic these claims must be, and specic claims
are unlikely to be infringed upon (i.e. ine¤ective patent protection). In
an environment with sequential innovations, patent breadth determines the
level of patent protection for an invention against imitation and subsequent
innovations. The former type of patent protection is referred to as lagging
breadth while the latter type of protection is referred to as leading breadth.
Also using the Grossman-Helpman (1991a) model, Li (2001) provides an
analysis of lagging breadth on R&D and growth and nds a positive e¤ect.
In other words, increasing protection against imitation improves the incen-
tives for R&D. Li (2001) considers an environment in which larger lagging
breadth allows the monopolistic rms to charge a higher markup, and hence
the unambiguous positive e¤ect follows. In some richer environments, Chin
(2007), Furukawa (2007) and Horii and Iwaisako (2007) show that increas-
ing patent protection against imitation has ambiguous e¤ects on R&D and
growth. Furukawa (2007) considers a model in which machine usage in the
past has a positive e¤ect (learning by experience) on current productivity
of nal goods. Horii and Iwaisako (2007) consider a model in which R&D
is more e¤ective in competitive industries than in patent-protected indus-
9See, also, Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Segerstrom et al. (1990) for other pioneering
studies on the quality-ladder growth model.
10Hunt (1999) and Koleda (2004) also nd that lowering the patentability requirement
can lead to opposing e¤ects on the incentives for innovation.
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tries. Therefore, when a higher level of IPR protection increases the num-
ber of monopolistic industries relative to competitive industries, it decreases
the learning-by-experience e¤ect in Furukawa (2007) and the average R&D
productivity in Horii and Iwaisako (2007). As for Chin (2007), she shows
that when IPR protection has asymmetric e¤ects on di¤erent generations of
households, it may also have a negative e¤ect on innovation.11
As for leading breadth, this instrument gives the patentholders property
rights over future inventions. Due to these overlapping patent rights, the cur-
rent generation of inventors may have to share their prots with the previous
generations of inventors. Therefore, increasing leading breadth has oppos-
ing e¤ects on the incentives for R&D. ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004)
analyze the e¤ects of leading breadth in the Grossman-Helpman (1991a)
model. On one hand, the consolidation of market power across generations
of inventors increases the amount of prots captured by an invention that
leads to a positive e¤ect on R&D. On the other hand, the lower present
value of prots received by an inventor due to delayed rewards from prot
sharing leads to a negative e¤ect provided that the interest rate is higher
than the prot growth rate. This negative e¤ect of leading breadth is of-
ten referred to as blocking patents.12 Based on detailed case studies, Ja¤e
and Lerner (2004) conclude that stronger patent rights may have adverse
e¤ects on R&D by preventing or delaying subsequent inventors from launch-
ing their higher-quality inventions.13 Chu (2009b) builds on the model in
ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004) to provide a quantitative analysis on
the e¤ects of blocking patents and nd that reducing the negative e¤ect
of blocking patents on R&D would lead to a signicant increase in social
welfare. Therefore, Chu (2009a, 2009b) together provide a comparison on
the relative e¤ectiveness of extending the patent length and reducing the
negative e¤ect of blocking patents on R&D and innovation. The di¤erence
between these two policy instruments is that extending the patent length
increases future prots while reducing the negative e¤ect of blocking patents
11Wu and Chou (2004) consider both public and private protection for IPR and nd that
increasing public protection for IPR may decrease innovation depending on the degree of
complementarity between public and private protection for IPR.
12Acs and Sanders (2009) and Cozzi and Galli (2009) also show that stronger patent
rights may decrease R&D by transferring an excessive amount of prots from the second-
generation inventors to the rst-generation inventors.
13Ja¤e and Lerner (2004) provide a detailed and insightful case-study analysis and argue
that the strengthening of patent rights in the US initiated in the 80s has converted the
patent system from a stimulator of innovation to a creator of litigation that results into
negative e¤ects on innovation. This is because current patentholders can now use their
enhanced bargaining power to stie future innovations.
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raises current prots for an inventor.
As for future research, the literature still lacks a standardized growth-
theoretic framework that can be used to evaluate the e¤ects of patent policies
quantitatively as the quote from Acemoglu (2009) in the introduction sug-
gests. Although Kwan and Lai (2003) and Chu (2009b) provide an attempt
to ll this gap in the literature, we still lack a systematic framework that
can be used to simultaneously analyze the quantitative e¤ects of multiple
patent-policy instruments as well as their optimal combination.
3 Empirical evidence on the e¤ects of IPR
To investigate the e¤ects of IPR protection on innovation, empirical studies
often employ a cross-country regression analysis. In this type of empirical
framework, a common measure of national IPR protection is the index of
patent rights constructed by Ginarte and Park (1997) and extended by Park
(2008a). Ginarte and Park (1997) examine ve categories of patent rights
and assign a score from zero to one to each category.14 Then, the IPR index
is a simple sum of these scores on a scale of zero to ve, and a larger number
indicates stronger patent rights. The updated IPR index from Park (2008a)
is available for 122 countries from 1960 to 2005 with one observation for
each 5-year interval.
A number of empirical studies, such as Varsakelis (2001), Kanwar and
Evenson (2003) and Park (2005), use this index to evaluate the e¤ects of
patent rights on R&D and nd a positive relationship.15 However, upon
separating between developed and developing countries, the e¤ects of patent
rights in developing countries become ambiguous. For example, while Chen
and Puttitanun (2005) nd that IPR protection in developing countries has
a positive and signicant e¤ect on innovation, Park (2005) nds that it has
an insignicant e¤ect on R&D. Similarly, Falvey et al. (2006) nd that IPR
protection has a positive and signicant e¤ect on growth in low-income and
high-income countries but not in middle-income countries. Therefore, one
can draw the following conclusion from this empirical literature. While em-
pirical studies nd supportive evidence for a positive relationship between
IPR and innovation, the evidence seems to be stronger for developed coun-
tries than for developing countries. A plausible interpretation on this nding
14The ve categories are (a) patent duration, (b) coverage, (c) enforcement mechanisms,
(d) restrictions on patent scope and (e) membership in international treaties.
15See also Park (2008b).
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is that developed countries are usually close to the technology frontier, so
that economic growth in these countries requires original innovations. In
contrast, developing countries are usually further away from the technology
frontier, so that economic growth can be driven by the reverse engineering of
foreign technologies. As a result, stronger patent rights that discourage the
reverse engineering of foreign technologies may stie the innovation process
in developing countries.
Finally, while the theoretical literature suggests that patent protection
has both positive and negative e¤ects on innovation, empirical studies gen-
erally nd a positive e¤ect. This empirical nding implies that the negative
e¤ects of IPR protection are dominated by the positive e¤ects. An impor-
tant caveat here is that the commonly-used empirical measure of patent
protection is a summary statistics on various categories of patent rights,
and it is not clear as to how each type of patent rights a¤ects innovation
empirically. Therefore, it would be interesting if future empirical studies
could investigate the e¤ects of the di¤erent patent-policy instruments on
innovation. Furthermore, existing empirical studies mostly focus on the ef-
fects of domestic patent protection on domestic innovation. However, an
open question in the open-economy theoretical literature (to be discussed in
the second part of this survey) is that whether stronger IPR protection in
the South improves or sties innovation in the North. Therefore, it would
be interesting if future empirical studies could shed some more light on this
issue as well.
4 Distortionary e¤ects and distributional conse-
quences of IPR protection
Section 2 argues that the theoretical e¤ect of IPR protection on R&D and
innovation is not necessarily positive, and Section 3 reviews the empirical
evidence that generally nds a positive e¤ect. This section discusses the
harmful e¤ects of IPR protection on the society even when stronger patent
rights are growth-enhancing. In undergraduate microeconomics, students
learn that monopoly imposes harmful deadweight loss on the society. When
policymakers increase the level of patent protection, it is like conferring
more market power to monopolists that amplies this deadweight loss. As
mentioned before, Nordhaus (1969) shows that the optimal level of patent
protection should tradeo¤ this harmful e¤ect against the welfare gain from
innovation. To capture this distortionary e¤ect in a general-equilibrium
9
model, patent protection can be modeled as allowing monopolists to charge
a higher markup and for a longer period of time. In this case, the harm-
ful e¤ect of patent protection can be captured as a relative-price distortion
(i.e. the markup price distorts the relative consumption between monopo-
listic goods and competitive goods from the socially optimal level), and this
distortion leads to a welfare loss.16 Furthermore, patent protection creates
other distortions in a general-equilibrium setting. For example, in a model
with elastic labor supply, the monopolistic markup a¤ects the real wage and
distorts labor supply from the optimal level. Similarly, in a model with
endogenous capital accumulation, the monopolistic markup creates a wedge
between the social marginal product of capital and its rental price and hence
distorts the share of output devoted to capital investment.17 Chou and Shy
(1993) show that in an overlapping-generation (OLG) model, the presence of
monopolistic prots created by patent protection leads to an additional dis-
tortion on innovation through the crowding-out e¤ect on portfolio space.18
In addition to these distortionary e¤ects, strengthening patent protec-
tion may also worsen income inequality via two channels (a) wage inequality
and (b) asset-income inequality. Provided that income inequality is a social
concern, these distributional consequences should also be taken into con-
sideration. When there are skilled and unskilled workers, stronger patent
rights would increase wage inequality by increasing the return to R&D and
the wage of R&D workers, who are mostly skilled labor. For example, Cozzi
and Galli (2009) extend the Grossman-Helpman (1991a) model to provide
a quantitative analysis on the e¤ects of patent protection on wage inequal-
ity in the US. Chu (2009c) also analyses the distributional consequences of
patent policy in the US but considers the e¤ects on income and consumption
inequality from an unequal distribution of wealth among households. In this
case, an increase in the level of patent protection increases the real interest
rate through the Euler equation; consequently, the income of asset-wealthy
households increases relative to asset-poor households. As for empirical evi-
16See, for example, ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004).
17See, for example, Chu (2009a, 2009b).
18Chou and Shy (1993) consider the portfolio crowding-out e¤ect rstly analyzed by
Laitner (1982), who shows that in an OLG model, the presence of monopolistic prots
creates the usual static (relative-price) distortion as well as a dynamic distortion on capital
accumulation by crowding-out the young generations saving devoted to investment in
tangible capital through the purchase of monopolistic rms. Chou and Shy (1993) use
this concept to analyze the crowding-out e¤ect of patent extension. They show that in
an OLG model with product development, the market value of existing inventions crowds
out the young generations saving devoted to investment in new product development,
and extending the patent length worsens this crowding-out e¤ect.
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dence, Adams (2008) uses the index of patent rights constructed by Ginarte
and Park (1997) and Park (2008a) as a measure of IPR protection and nds
that strengthening IPR protection has a positive and statistically signi-
cant e¤ect on income inequality. His estimates imply that increasing the
Ginarte-Park IPR index by one (on a scale of zero to ve) is associated with
an increase in the Gini coe¢ cient of 0.01 to 0.02 (on a scale of zero to one)
in developing countries.19
5 IPR protection in an open economy
This part of the paper considers the international aspects of IPR protec-
tion. In the previous section, we see that the optimal level of patent pro-
tection should tradeo¤ the welfare gains from innovation against the welfare
losses from distortions and possibly income inequality. However, due to
the positive externality of patent policy across countries, the Nash equilib-
rium level of IPR protection may be suboptimal. Intuitively, when each
country chooses the domestic level of IPR protection to maximize the wel-
fare of domestic households without taking into consideration the benets of
technology spillovers on foreign households, the non-cooperative equilibrium
level of IPR protection would be suboptimally low.
Using an open-economy version of the Romer model, Lai and Qiu (2003)
and Grossman and Lai (2004) show that the Nash equilibrium level of IPR
protection is indeed below the globally optimal level due to the spillover
e¤ects of innovation across countries. Also, they nd that (a) developed
countries (the North) would choose a higher level of IPR protection than
developing countries (the South) due to their asymmetry in innovative ca-
pability, (b) imposing the Norths level of IPR protection on the South as
required by TRIPS would lead to a welfare gain (loss) in the North (South),
and (c) the harmonization of IPR protection required by TRIPS is neither
necessary nor su¢ cient for maximizing global welfare. Chu and Peng (2009)
extend the analysis of Lai and Qiu (2003) and Grossman and Lai (2004) by
considering the e¤ects of IPR protection on income inequality across coun-
tries. They nd that stronger patent rights in one country would lead to
an increase in economic growth and income inequality in both domestic and
foreign countries. Also, they show that whether TRIPS would improve or
reduce global welfare depends on a structural parameter that determines
the domestic importance of foreign goods. If and only if foreign goods are
19Adams (2008) only considers developing countries in his study.
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su¢ ciently important for domestic consumption (i.e. a su¢ cient degree of
global integration), then the harmonization of IPR protection required by
TRIPS would improve global welfare. In summary, the conclusions from
this literature are that (a) an international coordination (rather than the
harmonization) of IPR protection is key to global welfare improvement and
(b) it is important to take into consideration the distributional implications
of TRIPS on developing countries (see below for the case of China).
Before joining the WTO in 2001, China reformed its patent system in
compliance with TRIPS.20 After this policy reform, the annual growth rate
of patent applications in China increases to 23% (compared to less than 10%
before 2000). Hu and Je¤erson (2009) show that the patent reform in 2000
is a major factor for this surge in patenting activities. In addition, R&D as a
share of GDP in China increases from an average of 0.7% in the 90s to 1.49%
in 2007. At the same time, the rising income inequality in China becomes a
potential threat to the countrys stability. In 2007, Chinas Gini coe¢ cient
rises to 0.47 that is above the threshold of 0.45 indicating potential social
unrest. For example, the United Nations Development Programme (2005)
. . . warned that the growing income gap between rich and poor in China
could threaten its stability, saying Beijing should increase social spending,
reform the scal system and push government reforms to narrow the gap.A
policy implication from Chu and Peng (2009) is that increasing IPR protec-
tion as a result of TRIPS has contributed to the rising income inequality in
China, and this theoretical prediction is supported by the empirical nding
in Adams (2008).
6 Foreign direct investment and product cycles
An important feature of the theoretical models in Lai and Qiu (2003), Gross-
man and Lai (2004) and Chu and Peng (2009) is that both the North and the
South engage in innovative R&D. However, for analytical tractability, these
studies abstract from some interesting issues, such as imitation from the
South and technology transfer from the North. These issues are considered
in a related literature, which analyses the e¤ects of strengthening South-
ern IPR protection on Northern innovation through a decrease in imitation
20The changes include (a) providing patent holders with the right to obtain a preliminary
injunction against the infringing party before ling a lawsuit, (b) stipulating standards
to compute statutory damages, (c) a¢ rming that state and non-state enterprises enjoy
equal patent rights, and (d) simplifying the patent application process, examination and
transfer procedures and unifying the appeal system.
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from the South and an increase in technology transfer from the North via
foreign direct investment (FDI). Although these studies usually make the
common simplifying assumption that innovative activities only take place in
the North,21 they tend to nd contrasting e¤ects of Southern IPR protection
on Northern innovation.
Grossman and Helpman (1991b) develop a North-South product-cycle
model with endogenous innovation in the North and endogenous imitation
in the South. Surprisingly, they nd that strengthening Southern IPR pro-
tection either has no e¤ect or a negative e¤ect on Northern innovation.22
Lai (1998) shows that whether Southern IPR protection (modeled as a pa-
rameter that a¤ects the rate of imitation in the South) has a positive or
negative e¤ect on Northern innovation depends on the mode of technology
transfer. If technology transfer occurs within multinational rms via FDI,
then Southern IPR protection has a positive e¤ect on Northern innovation.
On the other hand, if technology transfer occurs via imitation (i.e. Southern
rms copying the products of Northern rms), then the opposite is true. Lai
(1998) considers a North-South product-cycle model in which imitation is
exogenous and technology transfer to the South does not require adaptive
R&D by Southern rms (i.e. costless FDI). Both of these assumptions are
relaxed in subsequent studies. Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2009) consider a
model in which Northern rms invest in innovative R&D and their Southern
a¢ liates invest in adaptive R&D for transferring technology from the North.
Consistent with Lai (1998), they nd that strengthening Southern IPR pro-
tection (i.e. a decrease in the probability of Southern a¢ liatestechnology
being copied by other Southern rms) would increase the incentives for (a)
innovation in the North and (b) technology transfer to the South. In a re-
lated study, Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2007) consider a model in which
technology transfer to the South is via endogenous imitation of Northern
products. In this model, they nd that stronger IPR protection reduces
imitation of Northern products; as a result, more production remains in the
North and less resources are available for innovative R&D. It is worth noting
that Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2007, 2009) consider two polar cases of ei-
21See, for example, Grossman and Helpman (1991b), Helpman (1993), Lai (1998), Yang
and Maskus (2001) and Glass and Saggi (2002b). Glass and Saggi (2002a) consider a
model with two symmetric innovating countries. Chui et al. (2001) consider a North-
South growth model in which there are di¤erent stages of development in the South (from
low-skill manufacturing to imitation and then innovation); however, their general model
needs to be analyzed numerically.
22To be precise, Grossman and Helpman (1991b) consider a tax (subsidy) on imita-
tion that decreases (increases) Southern imitation, which is similar to the e¤ects of IPR
protection.
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ther FDI or imitation as the channel of technology transfer. However, they
conjecture that in a more general model, whether Southern IPR protection
has a positive or negative e¤ect on Northern innovation should depend on
the relative importance of FDI and imitation on technology transfer.23
7 Conclusion
This paper has surveyed studies that analyze the macroeconomic e¤ects
of IPR protection and drawn the following conclusions from the literature.
Firstly, di¤erent patent-policy instruments may have drastically di¤erent
e¤ects on R&D and economic growth. Secondly, there exists empirical ev-
idence that supports a positive relationship between IPR protection and
innovation. Thirdly, the optimal level of IPR protection should balance
between the social benets of enhanced innovation and the social costs of
monopolistic distortions and income inequality. Finally, in an open economy,
achieving the globally optimal level of protection requires an international
coordination (rather than the harmonization) of IPR protection.
Finally, let me conclude this survey by restating some potential issues
for future research. Firstly, as Acemoglu (2009) suggests, the literature
lacks a standardized growth-theoretic framework that can be used to eval-
uate patent policies quantitatively. In particular, we still lack a system-
atic framework that can be used to simultaneously analyze the quantitative
implications of di¤erent patent-policy instruments, such as patent length,
patentability requirement, lagging and leading patent breadth, as well as
their optimal combination. Secondly, the Ginarte-Park index (a compre-
hensive IPR index commonly-used by empirical studies) is constructed as an
aggregate of various patent rights. Given that the theoretical literature has
emphasized the asymmetric e¤ects of di¤erent patent-policy instruments, it
would be interesting if future empirical studies could shed some light on the
e¤ects of di¤erent patent-policy instruments on innovation. Finally, existing
empirical studies mostly focus on the e¤ects of domestic patent protection
on domestic innovation. Given that a central question in the open-economy
literature is whether Southern IPR protection improves or sties Northern
innovation, it would be interesting if future empirical studies can shed more
light on this issue as well.
23See, for example, Sener (2006) for a model in which technology transfer occurs through
both FDI and imitation. However, Sener (2006) only considers numerical simulation in
his analysis.
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